
Almost every American school kid is familiar with the story of Custer’s Last Stand, that infamous day in June, 1876 when George Armstrong Custer divided his cavalry force into three parts, then foolishly led one of those small contingents against an enormous Lakota Sioux village camped on the banks of the Little Bighorn River in what was then the eastern portion of the Montana Territory. Custer failed to perform even the most rudimentary reconnaissance of his adversary that day, and managed to get himself, two of his brothers, his brother-in-law, a nephew, not to mention the rest of his command, slaughtered as a result.
Almost everyone is familiar with that story. But what many people are unfamiliar with, is that during the Civil War, that same, rash George Armstrong Custer had managed to put himself and his entire outfit into exactly the same predicament – getting his Michigan brigade cut off and surrounded by Confederate cavalry to the point that, had not timely reinforcements broken through to his relief, Custer’s entire force might well have been destroyed.
The date was June 11, 1864, and the location was a small whistle-stop along the Virginia Central Railroad known as Trevilian Station. Custer’s Michigan brigade was part of a substantial cavalry raid ordered by General Ulysses S. Grant which was then moving west toward the Shenandoah Valley under the command of General Philip Sheridan. Grant, essentially pinned down at the time at Cold Harbor, had ordered Sheridan to move off with almost 10,000 riders in the hopes that he would draw off a substantial portion of Robert E. Lee’s cavalry, and with the additional objective of cutting the Confederacy’s northern supply line which ran from the Shenandoah down into Richmond. The enormous Federal column moved at a slow clip through Rebel territory, kicking-up massive clouds of dust as it did, entirely unaware of the fact that Lee’s scouts had spotted the Federal movement, and that the Confederate commander had immediately responded to the provocation with cavalry of his own.
Directing that Confederate response was General Wade Hampton, leading his own and General Fitz Lee’s (the commanding General’s nephew) divisions west at a pace determined to cut the Federals off before they could reach the Virginia Central and begin tearing up track. The Rebel force was considerably outnumbered, consisting of approximately 6,000 horsemen, but they had gotten the jump on Sheridan by taking a more direct route, and had thus been able to gain Trevilian Station just prior to Sheridan’s arrival. On the night of June 10 the Federals bedded down a few miles north of the station, stomachs full and campfires glowing, entirely unaware of the fact that Hampton’s riders had arrived and were determined to dispute the issue.